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 Until the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in 
2002, public accounting in the United States was self-regulated, relying on a peer review system. 
The review system required firms that practiced before the Securities and Exchanges 
Commission (SEC) to undergo periodic peer-review, sponsored by the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants AICPA (Church & Shefchik, 2012). This system allowed firms to 
choose their reviewer amongst their peers, potentially giving rise to independence issues. The 
system lacked punitive repercussions for audit firms that had quality issues as reviewed by their 
peers but, those quality issues discovered were publicly released; a punitive gesture in and of 
itself.  
 In the midst of the widely-publicized financial scandals of the early 2000’s, a call for 
reform was made and Congress announced plans for a major overhaul and regulation of public 
accounting firms. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, establishing the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The act placed the PCAOB as 
regulator of public accounting regulation and inspection, and by 2003, those inspections began 
(Church & Shefchik, 2012). Section 101 of SOX discloses the PCAOB’s four principle duties of, 
(1); to register public accounting firms, (2); establish and/or adopt auditing standards and 
standards of quality control, ethics, and independence, (3); conduct inspections, and (4); provide 
enforcement (PCAOB, 2004).  
 The pre-PCAOB atmosphere of public accounting came with criticisms of pressure and 
incentives of new business over quality; a general lack of independence from audit clients 
including non-audit services (consulting, tax, financial due-diligence) provided to audit clients, 
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using limited scrutiny in audits, and the de-emphasis of the concept materiality (Glover, Prawit, 
Taylor, 2009).  There are some indications however, that the pre-PCAOB atmosphere of public 
accounting was healthy and that the Sarbanes-Oxley act in fact hinders and complicates auditing.  
Kinney (2005) believes that auditors should focus on the auditing aspect of SOX, and not the 
regulatory and compliance aspects that are so heavily scrutinized. Regardless, the introduction of 
SOX in 2002 and the institutionalization of the PCAOB as a centralized and independent 
regulator has aimed at enhancing credibility of the capital markets of the United States.  This 
study serves as preliminary analysis to the effectiveness of the inspection processes and their 
perceived importance and relevance to external parties, primarily investors.  
Discussed in this study will be an overview of the current PCAOB inspection processes, 
including options for firm responses and final publication details. The study will examine current 
deficiency trends among annually inspected firms from 2009-2012, illustrating graphically the 
improvements or deterioration of firms as portrayed in their report. The study examines all firms 
that were inspected in 2012 and matches their clients and report stamp dates to examine 
abnormal changes in stock returns on time intervals surrounding the report stamp date. Although 
investors react differently when categorized by industry, the study finds that investors respond 
favorably to PCAOB inspection reports and that investors recognize these reports as value-
relevant, and consequently use them to make informed investment decisions.  
II. Inspection Processes: 
 Inspection reports of public accounting firms that audit public companies are meant to 
highlight audit deficiencies which translate to overall audit quality of the firm. One of the many 
goals of the PCAOB inspection reports is to identify these deficiencies so that the respective 
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accounting firm can make meaningful, calculated steps to enhance its effectiveness in the areas 
of audit quality that the firm lacks.  
Approximately 2500 accounting firms are registered with the PCAOB, and all are subject 
to inspection (Center for Audit Quality, 2012). Firms that audit more than 100 issuers per year 
are inspected on an annual basis, and all other firms are inspected on a triennial basis.  Firms that 
audit more than 100 issuers per year audit publicly traded companies that are attributable to 
almost 99% of U.S. based market capitalization (Church & Shefchik, 2012). The PCAOB 
inspects between 50 and 75 of the audit firm engagements per inspection cycle, and it publishes 
portions of their findings via web publication. Firms are given a chance to publicly respond to 
the PCAOB’s findings. Most frequently, audit firms respond with one of the four following 
scenarios: (1); the firm acknowledges the PCAOB findings, but does not make plain mention of a 
disagreement with said findings, (2); the firm acknowledges differences in professional judgment 
between the firm and inspectors of the PCAOB, without identifying specific disagreements with 
the findings, (3); the firm disagrees with some of the PCAOB findings, but does not specifically 
provide defense to disclaim findings, and (4); the firm disagrees with some of the PCAOB 
findings and adds arguments to defend quality and disclaim findings. Between 2005 and 2009, 
62.5% of firms have opted for option (3), disagreeing with PCAOB findings (Church & 
Shefchik, 2012).  
 With annually inspected audit firms, the PCAOB takes a risk-based target approach in 
scoping its reviews, selecting the riskiest engagements and processes. Factors of risk attributable 
to the company are related to the nature and market of the company, complexities in accounting 
(i.e. heavy use of derivatives), exposure to emerging markets, and audit issues that may be 
encountered. Additionally, the PCAOB considers risk factors that are specific to the audit firm 
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including prior PCAOB inspections, history of the partners and principals on the engagement, 
and previous findings of the firms overall internal risk assessments. (Center for Audit Quality, 
2012).  Usually for firms with small numbers of public company clients, the PCAOB may 
choose to inspect all audits. It is important to note that on average, triennial firms are more likely 
to be dismissed when they have GAAP deficiencies disclosed in an inspection report (Zhang and 
Gunny, 2013)  
Zhang and Gunny (2013) also suggest that inspection findings do not always inform 
external users about audit quality. Wainberg et al. (2013) suggest that findings of inspection 
reports as a result of the current approach of risk-based targeting can lead to misconceptions 
about overall audit quality. They suggest that the deficiencies per audit cannot be perceived as an 
average measurement of quality across all areas. Due to the fact that the sample inspected by the 
PCAOB is not representative of all audits, inspection results should be looked at with 
perspective, considering this risk-based approach. Additionally, the PCAOB’s relative use of the 
term “audit failure” coincides with potential misperceptions of external users. PCAOB member 
Jay Hanson remarked on the term at a conference in Philadelphia in March 2014 saying, “I don’t 
believe it is necessary or appropriate for us to deviate from this more commonly understood 
definition of ‘audit failure’ by using the term to refer to our inspection findings-- which are 
deficiencies in the firm’s work but not necessarily representative of problems in the audit client’s 
financial statements or internal controls” (Tysiac,2014).  Wainberg et al. (2013) also suggest that 
lack of statistical data in inspection reports can diffuse relevant information, making it difficult 
to assess deficiencies.   
The inspections include an evaluation of the firm’s overall quality control, and an 
examination of elements related to selected issuer engagements. Key goals of the inspection are 
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to determine whether the firm followed PCAOB auditing standards, whether the firm 
successfully identified areas where the financial statements did not conform to Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in a material manner, whether the firm handled 
adjustments to financial statements correctly, and whether there were any issues involving firm 
independence (Center for Audit Quality, 2012).  
Before the reports become available to the public, the firm will have an opportunity to 
work with the PCAOB to describe undocumented work, as well as resolve deficiencies identified 
during the inspection process. This provides the firm an opportunity to respond to a ‘comment 
form’ where the firm is to respond to PCAOB concerns in writing. This allows the firm to further 
explain their views on areas scrutinized by the inspection. The PCAOB reviews the responses on 
the ‘comment form’ and determines if the concern has been addressed and if the deficiency 
generates enough concern to be placed in the inspection report. (Center for Audit Quality, 2012). 
Once the PCAOB Board approves the final report, it is sent to the firm. The report contains Part 
I, discussing solely significant audit deficiencies found during the inspection, and Part II, 
discussing quality control criticisms. These quality control criticisms illustrate PCAOB concerns 
over potential quality issues firm-wide. Only Part I is made publicly available, as a gesture of 
good faith from the PCAOB that the firm will take sizeable steps at remediating issues related to 
overall quality (Church & Shefchik, 2012). It is important to note that audit deficiencies 
contained in Part I do not mean there was a material misstatement in the audited financial 
statements. The deficiencies contained in part one are identified only by ‘Issuer A, B, C, etc” and 
thus do not specifically identify the company for which the audit contained a deficiency.  
 Common deficiencies disclosed by the PCAOB related to specific audits include failures 
to perform proper audit procedures in planning and during the audit, as well as misapplications 
7 
 
of GAAP relating to testing of revenues, fair value measurements, estimates related to deferred 
tax assets and allowances for bad debts, and testing related to internal controls, specifically an 
inappropriate reliance on internal controls due to lack of sufficient testing (Church & Shefchik, 
2012).  
 For methods of remediation, the firm may expand audit procedures and fieldwork and 
provide additionally documentation. Additionally, PCAOB inspections may require re-visitation 
of certain audits to modify the firm’s audit opinion. (Center for Audit Quality, 2012). As 
mentioned above, the PCAOB may choose audits where it had previously found significant audit 
deficiencies to inspect in the future as part of its risk based inspection selection strategy. For 
quality control criticism, highlighted in the non-public Part II, the firm has twelve months to 
address said criticisms. Failure to adequately address such concerns results in the publication of 
Part II to the investing public. The Center for Audit Quality (2012) marks this as a signified link 
between the inspection process and improving steps in quality control of future audits.  
Additionally, the PCAOB has the power to impose punitive charges including fines for 
unintentional violations (up to $100,000 per individual and $2,000,000 per firm) and intentional 
violations (up to $750,000 per individual and $15,000,000 per firm). A recent instance of 
penalties arising from a PCAOB inspection at Deloitte & Touche involved an audit partner who 
intentionally issued a clean opinion with known, unadjusted material misstatements on a client’s 
financial statements. The PCAOB levied a $2 million fine on Deloitte & Touche, and a $25,000 
fine on the partner. Additionally, the PCAOB barred the partner from practicing in an audit role 




III. Deficiency Trends of Annually Inspected Firms 
 PCAOB inspections are usually published 1-2 years after the inspection occurred. Abbott 
et al. (2013) provide preliminary evidence of auditor dismissals over audit quality. Their results 
showed that auditor dismissals increase as the severity of the deficiency increases. The sample 
studied showed that more triennially inspected firms were dismissed after a GAAP-deficient 
report was issued and that GAAS-deficient reports are uninformative to external parties. Their 
research is complementary to Lennox and Pitman (2010), who examined changes in auditor 
dismissals from the ‘old’ peer review system to the ‘new’ PCAOB process. They concluded that 
there was there did not appear to be an increase of auditor dismissals resulting from the current 
process.  The study suggested that there is no relation with deficiencies and changes in market 
share of audit firms. Since Abbott et al (2013) investigated only triennially inspected firms, more 
research can examine annually inspected firms. Acito et al. (2013), in their study of ‘Big Four’ 
audit firms, conversely suggests that auditors with deficient audits found in inspection reports are 
positively related to auditor changes, but not changes in audit fees.  
To begin my analysis, I first examine deficiency percentages during the period 2009 -
2012.  In recent years, there has been a trend of audit deficiency percentages increasing across 
Big Four and national, but annually inspected firms. I calculate the deficiency percentages as the 
ratio of audits that had one or more deficiency over total audits inspected by PCAOB inspectors. 
Table 1.1 depicts individual Big Four firms’ deficiency rates compared to Big Four and national 
firms1 averages. Table 1.2 depicts individual national firms deficiency rates compared to Big 
Four and regional firm averages.  
                                                          
1 Annual firms are non-Big 4 firms that are inspected annually. Additionally, it is important to note that 
MaloneBailey, which is now annually inspected, was triennially inspected prior to 2012. 
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Objectives and Basis for Research 
 The issue of audit quality continues to be a topic of great importance to audit firms, the 
PCAOB and financial statement users. However, little is known concerning the reactions of 
external users, including audit clients, shareholders, and general investors to inspection reports. 
Therefore, the intention of this research is to perform an event study, tracking inspection reports 
for firms while analyzing market reactions in conjunction with PCAOB inspection report release. 
I also separately analyze market reactions for Big-4 and national auditing firms.  Finally, I will 
analyze market reactions using Standardized Industrial Classification (SIC) coding to interpret 
and better understand PCAOB inspection reports across twelve separate industries as defined by 
Fama & French (1997).  My goal is to develop informative links between PCAOB inspections 
and perceived of audit quality by investors.  
 In theory, the PCAOB’s inspections lend further credibility to the attestation of the audit 
firm, but also the financial position of the client. I chose to measure investor perception on using 
abnormal stock returns to easier identify these market reactions. To enhance my underlying 
theory, it would seem likely that if an investor felt that they could not trust the work of an auditor 
based on the deficiencies shown in a PCAOB inspection report, that investor could potentially 
sell their investment in publicly traded companies affiliated with said auditor. This assumption is 
similar to Offermanns and Peak (2013) as well as Dee et al (2011).  
 Chaney and Philipich (2002) provide evidence that audit firm reputation is a deciding 
factor in many investment decisions, particularly Initial Public Offerings (IPO). Another study 
conducted by Weber et al. (2008) confirm that clients of KPMG had cumulative negative 
abnormal returns of 3% during events in 2002 when the firm was implicated with accounting 
fraud at ComROAD AG, a German company.  Collectively, this evidence suggests that audit 
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quality, especially instances of auditor infractions, can influence investors’ perceptions of 
financial statement quality because negative events with auditors are associated with negative 
stock returns of the auditors’ client portfolio. 
Research Method 
 I quantify investor reaction by conducting an event study based around the inspection 
report stamp date of reports made public in 2013. Reports made public in 2013 consist of 
findings from 2012 audit inspections by the PCAOB2. The first objective was to obtain a list of 
inspection reports published in 2013, particularly inspections of annually inspected firms. Table 
2.1 contains a summary of my sample. Next, I obtained a list of the publicly traded companies 
and their auditors from Audit Analytics. I assigned the event date of each company to correspond 
with the date that the auditor’s PCAOB inspection report was released. Using company tickers, I 
obtained each companies’ PERMNO, identifying the companies for the event study. Next I 
assigned the Standardized Industrial Classification (SIC), using the method developed by Fama 
and French (1997). Table 2.2 contains a summary of the respective industries within my sample. 
This allows the event study to test mean abnormal returns by industry. I then pulled the third 
layer of Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) codes, matching each company with its 
respective TICKER The fourth layer was assorted PCAOB inspection report stamp date for each 
respective auditor for 2013. Companies that had not been inspected were omitted.  
 I conducted three tests; (1) All, (2) “Big 4” versus non “Big 4” (Tables 2.3 and 2.4) that 
were annually inspected, and (3) tests of each of the twelve SIC Industries. This provides 
evidence about investors’ reactions to PCAOB inspections, and the design allows for 
                                                          
2 The reports are available at the PCAOB’s website (http://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Public_Reports/index.aspx) 
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investigation of moderating effects of auditor type and industry classification. Using company 
CRSPs matched with inspection report dates of each company’s auditor’s inspection report, I 
conduct my tests of market reactions using Eventus. The event study used PERMNO’s as our 
lead identifier, CRSP value weighted market indices while adding Market Adjusted Returns 
(MAR) as an additional benchmark for measurement. Our estimation period was the standard 
Eventus Basic Event Study parameters of -45 days before event date, with minimum estimation 
length of 3 days and maximum estimation length of 255 days.   For the event windows, I used 
the time intervals (-1,1), which is consistent Offermanns (2013). I also consider the following 
windows, which is consistent with Dee et al. (2011):  (0,0), (0,1), (0,2).  The release of the 
PCAOB inspection reports is day 0, and the consideration of multiple event windows enables me 
to make inferences about length of time that is necessary for investors to incorporate the 
information related to the content of the inspection reports. 
IV. Results: 
 
 For Test 1, shown at Table 3.1, we sampled all companies, totaling to 4,806 issuers in 
2012. We noted significant positive mean cumulative abnormal returns on the inspection report 
stamp date (0,0) and days surrounding the stamp date (-1,1), (0,1), and (0,2). With this time 
period, I examine the effects of abnormal returns on the day before, day of, and one and two days 
after the stamp date. A graphical representation of this set up is also seen at Table 3.4. This 
research design is consistent with Offermanns and Peak (2013) and Dee et al. (2011).  
 In Test 2, examining only ‘Big Four’ firms I observe a similar result to Test 1. This is 
likely because of all the firms tested, 3,890 issuers of the 4,900 (81%) issuers we tested were 
audited by a ‘Big Four’ firm. Consequently, this test also showed significant changes in positive 
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mean cumulative abnormal returns on the inspection report stamp date (0,0) and days 
surrounding the stamp date (-1,1), (0,1), and (0,2). This is shown at Table 3.2. As an additional 
test, I analyze non ‘Big Four’ firms, but annually inspected audit firms’ issuers. This test used 
data from 609 issuers, and found that positive cumulative abnormal returns were lower on the 
inspection report stamp date (0,0) but were higher on (0,1) and (0,2), respectively. This is 
presented in Table 3.3.Regardless of the relative magnitude, the returns for each of the windows 
are positive and significant. 
 The results for Test 2 suggest that investors react on the day of the report release (0,0), 
but it take a few days additionally to interpret the results and implications of the inspection 
report. Returns that include at least one day often appear greater than (0,0) which indicates a 
delay in investor reaction.  Another interpretation of Test 2 results suggest that investors react 
positively to results of inspection reports because they potentially signify PCAOB inspections as 
adding value to their investments. Additionally, these findings coincide with Offermanns and 
Peek (2013) who suggest investor reactions are generally positive due to audit firms doing better 
than expected in respective PCAOB inspections, as in investors were expecting worse results 
than what was published. Table 3.4 graphically depicts the results from Test 1 and 2.  
 Test 3, broken down by industry at was where each analysis was segmented by industry 
classification (Fama and French, 1997). These results aggregated each issuer to its specific 
industry to gain a better picture of affects and implications of investor sentiment within that 
industry. The results are broken down by industry and shown in Table 3.3. Although the result of 
each respective industry varies greatly, we note that there are significant cumulative abnormal 
returns for many industries, specifically the Business Computers and Utilities Industries. 
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 The Business Computers Industry follows the pattern of Test 2, showing a dip in positive 
abnormal cumulative return on the stamp date (0,0) and an increase on (0,1) and (0,2), 




The Business Computers Industry may be less sensitive than the Utilities industry, 
discussed below, because investors of this industry may enjoy consistent, more predicable stock 
returns. Fornell et al. (2006) conclude that companies in this industry may enjoy large returns 












(-1,1) 660 0.53% 4.188 1.314 4.774 ***
(0,0) 660 0.05% 1.996 0.226 2.670 **
(0,1) 660 0.37% 3.340 1.121 2.826 **
(0,2) 660 0.32% 2.810 0.797 0.800

































investors may regard inspection reports as further assurance that their investments are being 
accurately audited.  
For the Utility Industry, which includes public utilities, natural gas providers, as well as 
land, sea, and air transportation, we see (-1,1) showing a negative abnormal cumulative return. 
However on (0,0) we see a significant positive abnormal cumulative return, followed by a return 




 This may be due to the extreme sensitivity in the Utility Industry compared to other 
industries. This sensitivity may be due to heavy regulation, the threat of collusion, an abundance 












(-1,1) 137 -0.40% -4.104 -0.808 -2.901 **
(0,0) 137 0.30% 3.516 1.054 3.764 ***
(0,1) 137 -0.06% -1.366 -0.144 -2.046 *




The results in Test 3 suggest that investors may react differently with issuers in different 
industries. This is clearly illustrated with the Business Equipment versus the Utility Industry. 
There could be a number of factors as to why investors of each industry react differently with the 
release of inspection reports. Also, investors may regard inspection report results with different, 
varying degrees of importance in each industry. This may be due to certain issuers in these 
respective industries, coinciding with the sensitivities of investors of each industry.  
Conclusion: 
 This study provides statistical evidence that investors respond to PCAOB inspection 
reports. These responses are, on average, in a positive manner as demonstrated by an 
examination of cumulative abnormal returns for issuers tested.  Further, this also suggests that 
investors recognize these reports as value-relevant, and consequently use them to make informed 
investment decisions. It is important to note, however, that there may be a delay in investor 
reaction possibly to the time needed to understand and interpret the value-adding information 
from these reports.  
 The results may serve as an important benchmark for measuring the PCAOB’s intentions 
of establishing standards of auditing and quality control. Investor reactions to these inspection 
reports signify that they understand the PCAOB’s aims to increase auditor quality and 
responsibility to accuracy through inspection and enforcement. These reactions also imply that 
they are being used as a reliable tool for judgment of the financial health of publicly traded 
companies.  
 As mentioned in the findings of Offermann’s and Peak (2013), further research could aim 
at discovering which aspects of these reports are most important to investors (i.e. GAAP 
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departure, GAAS departure, or other deficiencies). This report serves as an event study for 
inspection reports released in 2013. It could potentially be insightful to examine market reactions 
for multiple years, and comparing these results to view changes in investor sentiment. 
Additionally, surveying seasoned investors about their personal perceptions of these reports may 
aid in identifying the portions of the inspection reports they find most relevant. Further may 
research may also want to consider not just investor reactions, but also the influence of these 
reports on creditors, analysts, suppliers, or any other external user of financial statements on their 



























2009 2010 2011 2012
Ernst & Young 9% 21% 36% 48%
Deloitte & Touche 21% 46% 42% 25%
PricewaterhouseCoopers 12% 39% 41% 39%
KPMG 13% 23% 23% 34%
Big 4 Average 14% 32% 36% 37%























2009 2010 2011 2012
McGladrey 21% 47% 50% 50%
Grant Thornton 13% 37% 40% 65%
Crowe Horwath 15% 62% 62% 50%
BDO 24% 26% 39% 55%
Non Big 4 Average 18% 43% 48% 55%























Test N Value 
Test 1 “All”3 4806 
Test 2 “Big Four” 3891 
Test 2 non “Big Four” annual 614 
Test 3 ALL Industries 4611 
 
Table 2.2 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Industries 
# SAMPLED DESCRIPTION 
#1 169 
Consumer Nondurables: Food, Tabacco, Textiles, Apparel, Leather, 
Toys 
#2 94 Consumer Durables: Cars, TV's, Furniture, Household Appliances 
#3 350 
Manufacturing: Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Office Furniture, Paper, 
Printing 
#4 226 Energy: Oil, Gas and Coal Extraction and Products 
#5 94 Chemicals: Chemicals and Allied Products 
#6 660 Business Equipment: Computers, Software, and Electronic Equipment 
#7 127 Telecommunications: Telephone and Television Transmission 
#8 137 Utilities 
#9 342 Shops: Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 
#10 433 Health: Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 
#11 1349 Money: Finance 
#12 630 Other: Mines, Construction, Transport, Hotels, Entertainment 






                                                          
3 Test 1 includes all firms inspected in 2012, including annual and triennial firms. Test 2 includes all Big-Four firms, 
and T non-Big-Four annually inspected firms.  Therefore, the sum of observations in Test 2 will not sum and agree 





"Big Four" Firms 
FIRM SAMPLED 
INSPECTION REPORT STAMP 
DATE 
Deloitte & Touche 871 6/28/2013 
Ernst & Young LLP 1239 6/28/2013 
KPMG LLP 809 7/30/2013 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
LLP 972 8/20/2013 
TOTAL BIG 4 3891  
 
Table 2.4 
Non "Big Four" Firms Inspected Annually 
FIRM SAMPLED INSPECTION REPORT STAMP DATE 
BDO, USA LLP 212 10/22/2013 
Crowe Horwath LLP 84 5/23/2013 
Grant Thornton LLP 225 11/21/2013 
MaloneBailey LLP 8 10/1/2013 
McGladrey LLP 85 4/23/2013 























(-1, +1) 4806 0.40% 6.323 *** 2.491 ** 5.476 *** 
(0,0) 4805 0.16% 4.794 *** 1.707 * 2.432 ** 
(0, +1) 4806 0.29% 5.087 *** 2.200 * 4.207 *** 
(0, +2) 4806 0.28% 3.667 *** 1.769 * 2.158 * 
 
Table 3.2 

















(-1, +1) 3891 0.43% 6.054 *** 2.326 * 6.015 *** 
(0,0) 3890 0.17% 5.056 *** 1.626 $ 3.081 *** 
(0, +1) 3891 0.27% 4.339 *** 1.816 * 4.508 *** 
(0, +2) 3891 0.24% 2.217 * 1.293 $ 1.942 * 
 
Table 3.3 
















(-1, +1) 609 0.25% 1.544 $ 0.712   0.36 
(0,0) 609 0.05% -0.107   0.231   -0.775 
(0, +1) 609 0.38% 2.480 ** 1.334 $ 0.603 





The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 intervals respectively, 












The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 intervals respectively, 















(-1, +1) 4805 0.40% 0.43% 0.25%
(0,0) 4806 0.16% 0.17% 0.05%
(0, +1) 4806 0.29% 0.27% 0.38%
































(-1, +1) 169 1.36% 3.120 3.757 2.770
(0,0) 169 0.59% 2.083 2.819 1.846
(0, +1) 169 1.06% 2.996 3.580 2.616
(0, +2) 169 1.00% 2.070 2.752 1.692
























(-1, +1) 94 1.24% 3.217 1.954 3.823
(0,0) 94 0.62% 2.862 1.698 2.379
(0, +1) 94 1.15% 3.493 2.219 3.616
(0, +2) 94 1.24% 3.239 1.949 2.997







The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 intervals respectively, 













(-1, +1) 350 0.62% 3.609 1.423 2.539
(0,0) 350 0.13% 1.232 0.507 1.149
(0, +1) 350 0.21% 2.211 0.583 1.684
(0, +2) 350 0.32% 3.113 0.721 2.539





















(-1, +1) 227 -0.02% -0.498 -0.028 -0.498
(0,0) 226 0.26% 1.283 0.706 -0.169
(0, +1) 227 0.30% 0.836 0.574 1.326
(0, +2) 227 0.67% 1.756 1.044 2.690








The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 intervals respectively, 













(-1,1) 94 -0.36% -0.134 -0.677 -0.312
(0,0) 94 -0.09% -1.223 -0.293 -0.312
(0,1) 94 -0.26% -0.988 -0.609 0.513
(0,2) 94 -0.33% -1.462 -0.623 -0.106









The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 intervals respectively, 













(-1,1) 660 0.53% 4.188 1.314 4.774 ***
(0,0) 660 0.05% 1.996 0.226 2.670 **
(0,1) 660 0.37% 3.340 1.121 2.826 **
(0,2) 660 0.32% 2.810 0.797 0.800





































The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 intervals respectively, 














(-1,1) 127 0.85% 2.601 1.649 1.164
(0,0) 127 0.18% 1.422 0.597 -0.611
(0,1) 127 0.38% 1.496 0.910 0.809
(0,2) 127 0.46% 1.205 0.906 -0.434







The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 intervals respectively, 














(-1,1) 137 -0.40% -4.104 -0.808 -2.901 **
(0,0) 137 0.30% 3.516 1.054 3.764 ***
(0,1) 137 -0.06% -1.366 -0.144 -2.046 *









The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 intervals respectively, 














(-1,1) 342 0.34% 2.468 0.974 0.630
(0,0) 342 0.13% 1.217 0.644 0.954
(0,1) 342 0.19% 1.787 0.669 0.954
(0,2) 342 0.19% 1.627 0.531 1.062







The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 intervals respectively, 














(-1,1) 433 1.29% 5.078 2.712 5.720 ***
(0,0) 433 0.37% 1.951 1.339 1.585 $
(0,1) 433 1.09% 4.972 2.805 4.374 ***
(0,2) 433 1.14% 4.172 2.395 4.182 ***







The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 intervals respectively, 














(-1,1) 1349 0.11% 0.886 0.437 0.047
(0,0) 1349 0.08% 0.897 0.543 -1.642 $
(0,1) 1349 0.05% -0.665 0.213 -1.260
(0,2) 1349 0.07% -0.532 0.257 -1.914 *







The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 intervals respectively, 













(-1,1) 630 0.26% 1.481 0.762 1.656 *
(0,0) 630 0.15% 1.421 0.731 0.540
(0,1) 630 0.16% 1.453 0.570 1.736 *
(0,2) 630 0.08% 0.961 0.226 1.337 $
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